Difference between revisions of "Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188 (1972)"
From Criminal Defense Wiki
Jump to navigationJump to search| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
| − | |||
== Summary == | == Summary == | ||
In Neil v. Biggers, the US Supreme Court provided the defendant with a mechanism to challenge a pre-trial identification by requesting a hearing on the validity of the identification. The two-pronged test asks 1) whether the identification procedure was suggestive and 2) if it was suggestive, were there indicia of reliability such that the witness's testimony should still be admissible even if the procedure was suggestive. | In Neil v. Biggers, the US Supreme Court provided the defendant with a mechanism to challenge a pre-trial identification by requesting a hearing on the validity of the identification. The two-pronged test asks 1) whether the identification procedure was suggestive and 2) if it was suggestive, were there indicia of reliability such that the witness's testimony should still be admissible even if the procedure was suggestive. | ||
| Line 264: | Line 263: | ||
the police at the time of the crime. And although we might reasonably disagree with the lower courts' findings as to such matters, the "two-court" rule wisely inhibits us from cavalierly substituting our own view of the facts simply because we might adopt a different construction of the evidence or resolve the ambiguities differently. On the contrary, these findings are "final here in the absence of very exceptional showing of error." Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U. S. 211, 335 U. S. 214 (1948). The record before us is simply not susceptible of such a showing and, indeed, the petitioner does not argue otherwise. I would therefore dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted insofar as it relates to Question 2 of the Questions Presented. | the police at the time of the crime. And although we might reasonably disagree with the lower courts' findings as to such matters, the "two-court" rule wisely inhibits us from cavalierly substituting our own view of the facts simply because we might adopt a different construction of the evidence or resolve the ambiguities differently. On the contrary, these findings are "final here in the absence of very exceptional showing of error." Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U. S. 211, 335 U. S. 214 (1948). The record before us is simply not susceptible of such a showing and, indeed, the petitioner does not argue otherwise. I would therefore dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted insofar as it relates to Question 2 of the Questions Presented. | ||
| + | |||
| + | ---- | ||
| + | See [[Important U.S. Cases]] | ||
