Difference between revisions of "Priest-Penitent Privilege"
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A defendant's right to evidence under the compulsory process clause may, in certain circumstances, trump another defenant's right to assert the priest-penitent privilege. An interesting case that explores this question is Morales v. Portuondo. | A defendant's right to evidence under the compulsory process clause may, in certain circumstances, trump another defenant's right to assert the priest-penitent privilege. An interesting case that explores this question is Morales v. Portuondo. | ||
| − | In Morales, the defendant brought a federal habeas petition on grounds that the defendant's compulsory process rights had been violated when a court declined to admit the hearsay testimony of a priest who received a confessional communication that would have exonerated the defendant. | + | In Morales, the defendant brought a federal ''habeas'' petition on grounds that the defendant's compulsory process rights had been violated when a court declined to admit the hearsay testimony of a priest who received a confessional communication that would have exonerated the defendant. |
In 1989 defendants Morales and and Montalvo were convicted of homicide in the Bronx. Not long thereafter, Father Joseph Towle received a call from Jesus Forne asking the father to visit him at his home. When Father Towle arrived, Jesus confessed to the killing, saying he could not believe that Morales and Montalvo had been convicted. The alleged confession only came to light after the priest, suffering with guilt, wrote to one of the men convicted of the crime in jail offering to help in any way that did not violate the confidences of the priest. | In 1989 defendants Morales and and Montalvo were convicted of homicide in the Bronx. Not long thereafter, Father Joseph Towle received a call from Jesus Forne asking the father to visit him at his home. When Father Towle arrived, Jesus confessed to the killing, saying he could not believe that Morales and Montalvo had been convicted. The alleged confession only came to light after the priest, suffering with guilt, wrote to one of the men convicted of the crime in jail offering to help in any way that did not violate the confidences of the priest. | ||
Towle convinced Forne to visit a Legal Aid Society attorney. But acting in his capacity, the attorney convinced Forne to plead the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. As a result, Forne never testified. Forne was killed in 1997. | Towle convinced Forne to visit a Legal Aid Society attorney. But acting in his capacity, the attorney convinced Forne to plead the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. As a result, Forne never testified. Forne was killed in 1997. | ||
| − | In 2000 Father Towle finally chose to divulge the confession in affidavit which formed the basis of a habeas proceeding. In order to wriggle himself free of the privilege, Father Towle concluded that in fact, the confession was not sacramental or confidential in nature and was instead what he termed a "heart-to-heart." | + | |
| + | In 2000 Father Towle finally chose to divulge the confession in affidavit which formed the basis of a ''habeas'' proceeding. In order to wriggle himself free of the privilege, Father Towle concluded that in fact, the confession was not sacramental or confidential in nature and was instead what he termed a "heart-to-heart." | ||
The government claimed that the statement was inadmissible as a matter of law because the confessor, now dead, had never waived the privilege. In addition, they argued that the statements would be inadmissible hearsay and did not qualify as declarations against penal interest. | The government claimed that the statement was inadmissible as a matter of law because the confessor, now dead, had never waived the privilege. In addition, they argued that the statements would be inadmissible hearsay and did not qualify as declarations against penal interest. | ||
Citing Chambers v. Mississippi, Judge Chin concluded that if due process was at risk, the testimony could be admissible if it was "vital" to the defense, even if it was hearsay as long as it bore sufficient indicia of reliability. Because Fornes had repeated the confession four times to different parties, it had a high level of reliability. | Citing Chambers v. Mississippi, Judge Chin concluded that if due process was at risk, the testimony could be admissible if it was "vital" to the defense, even if it was hearsay as long as it bore sufficient indicia of reliability. Because Fornes had repeated the confession four times to different parties, it had a high level of reliability. | ||
