Difference between revisions of "GPS Evidence and the Fourth Amendment"
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The court noted that there was no evidence the drum was ever within the defendant's home, where he could have had a higher level of privacy expectation. | The court noted that there was no evidence the drum was ever within the defendant's home, where he could have had a higher level of privacy expectation. | ||
| − | In Karo, the Court was faced with a similar | + | In Karo, the Court was faced with a similar situation. However, in Karo the beeper was used to determine the exact location of the GPS unit within a storage facility. |
In 2009, the Wisconsin Court was faced with the question of whether the placement of a GPS monitoring device on the defendant's vehicle violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. The court's reasoning was based on Knotts and Karo: | In 2009, the Wisconsin Court was faced with the question of whether the placement of a GPS monitoring device on the defendant's vehicle violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. The court's reasoning was based on Knotts and Karo: | ||
| − | <blockquote>Knotts and Karo teach that, to the extent a tracking device reveals vehicle travel information visible to the general public, and thus obtainable by warrantless visual surveillance, the use of the device does not normally implicate Fourth Amendment protections. It follows that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred here simply because the police used a GPS device to obtain information about | + | <blockquote>Knotts and Karo teach that, to the extent a tracking device reveals vehicle travel information visible to the general public, and thus obtainable by warrantless visual surveillance, the use of the device does not normally implicate Fourth Amendment protections. It follows that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred here simply because the police used a GPS device to obtain information about the defendant's car that was visible to the general public.<ref>State of Wisconsin v. Sveum, 2008AP658-CR (2008)</ref></blockquote> |
Until 2010, all major U.S. Courts of Appeals who looked at the issue reached the same conclusion. <ref>United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010);United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010)</ref> | Until 2010, all major U.S. Courts of Appeals who looked at the issue reached the same conclusion. <ref>United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010);United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010)</ref> | ||
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However, in August 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia broke with precedent by concluding that the use of GPS evidence could violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.<ref>United States of American v. Maynard, No. 08-3030 (Aug. 6, 2010)</ref> | However, in August 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia broke with precedent by concluding that the use of GPS evidence could violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.<ref>United States of American v. Maynard, No. 08-3030 (Aug. 6, 2010)</ref> | ||
| − | In Maynard the police used a GPS device on the defendant's vehicle 24 hours a day for four weeks. The police did not have a warrant to use the GPS device. | + | In Maynard, the police used a GPS device on the defendant's vehicle 24 hours a day for four weeks. The police did not have a warrant to use the GPS device. |
The court rejected the government's contention that Knotts was binding precedent. They distinguished Knotts by concluding that the kind of comprehensive, sustained monitoring that comes from GPS use was of a different nature than the beeper information in Knotts and that the information gleaned from the GPS unit was not in fact "public": | The court rejected the government's contention that Knotts was binding precedent. They distinguished Knotts by concluding that the kind of comprehensive, sustained monitoring that comes from GPS use was of a different nature than the beeper information in Knotts and that the information gleaned from the GPS unit was not in fact "public": | ||
| − | + | <blockquote>Two considerations persuade us that Jones' probability that anyone will observe all those movements is effectively very low | |
The court then looked at the second step, whether the defendant's expectation of privacy was "reasonable.": | The court then looked at the second step, whether the defendant's expectation of privacy was "reasonable.": | ||
