Voluntariness Test - Revision history

Durankar at 13:52, 16 February 2011

2011-02-16T13:52:46Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:52, 16 February 2011
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	Deception alone is usually not enough to warrant exclusion of a confession as involuntary. In Frazier v. Cupp <ref> Frazier v. Cupp,		Deception alone is usually not enough to warrant exclusion of a confession as involuntary. In Frazier v. Cupp <ref> Frazier v. Cupp,
	394 U.S. 731 (1969)</ref>, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a confession when the police falsely told the defendant that his cousin had confessed to the crime. The ~~court~~ held that deception was just one factor in the voluntariness test and that deception in and of itself was not dispositive.		394 U.S. 731 (1969)</ref>, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a confession when the police falsely told the defendant that his cousin had confessed to the crime. The Court held that deception was just one factor in the voluntariness test and that deception in and of itself was not dispositive.

	In certain circumstances, police misconduct may be so egregious that the confession evidence should be excluded without regard for how that conduct the defendant.		In certain circumstances, police misconduct may be so egregious that the confession evidence should be excluded without regard for how that conduct affected the defendant.
	----		----
	See [[Confessions]], [[McNabb-Mallory Rule]]		See [[Confessions]], [[McNabb-Mallory Rule]]
	==Notes==		==Notes==
	<references/>		<references/>

Durankar at 13:51, 16 February 2011

2011-02-16T13:51:02Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:51, 16 February 2011
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	*Psychological threats		*Psychological threats
	*Police conduct during interrogation		*Police conduct during interrogation
	*Whether force or threat of force was used during interrogation		*Whether force or threat of force was used during interrogation.
	Similarly, the factfinder must examine the defendant's subjective state of mind to determine whether given all those factors, the confessions was, in fact, involuntary. In doing so, they should consider the defendant's physical and mental characteristics: age, race, education, history and psychological state of mind during the interrogation.		Similarly, the factfinder must examine the defendant's subjective state of mind to determine whether given all those factors, the confessions was, in fact, involuntary. In doing so, they should consider the defendant's physical and mental characteristics: age, race, education, history and psychological state of mind during the interrogation.

Durankar at 13:50, 16 February 2011

2011-02-16T13:50:28Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:50, 16 February 2011
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	The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals. First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.		The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals. First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.

	Voluntariness is determined by a factfinder (judge or jury) by examining and taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances.<ref>Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)</ref>.		Voluntariness is determined by a factfinder (judge or jury) by examining and taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances.<ref>Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)</ref>

	Factors may include objective factors such as:		Factors may include objective factors such as:

Durankar at 13:49, 16 February 2011

2011-02-16T13:49:52Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:49, 16 February 2011
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	Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that [[False Confessions / Admissions\| false confessions]] are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.		Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that [[False Confessions / Admissions\| false confessions]] are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.

	The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals: First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.		The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals. First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.

	Voluntariness is determined by a factfinder (judge or jury) by examining and taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances.<ref>Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)</ref>.		Voluntariness is determined by a factfinder (judge or jury) by examining and taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances.<ref>Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)</ref>.

Ibjadmin at 10:55, 16 February 2011

2011-02-16T10:55:15Z

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	<blockquote>Coercing the supposed state's criminals into confessions and using such confessions so coerced from them against them in trials has been the curse of all countries. It was the chief inequity, the crowning infamy, of the Star Chamber and the Inquisition, and other similar institutions. The constitution recognized the evils that lay behind these practices, and prohibited them in this country. . . . The duty of maintaining constitutional rights of a person on trial for his life rises above mere rules of procedure, and wherever the court is clearly satisfied that such violations exist, it will refuse to sanction such violations and will apply the corrective.<Ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) quoting Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116, 134 (1926)</ref></blockquote>		<blockquote>Coercing the supposed state's criminals into confessions and using such confessions so coerced from them against them in trials has been the curse of all countries. It was the chief inequity, the crowning infamy, of the Star Chamber and the Inquisition, and other similar institutions. The constitution recognized the evils that lay behind these practices, and prohibited them in this country. . . . The duty of maintaining constitutional rights of a person on trial for his life rises above mere rules of procedure, and wherever the court is clearly satisfied that such violations exist, it will refuse to sanction such violations and will apply the corrective.<Ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) quoting Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116, 134 (1926)</ref></blockquote>

	Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that [[False Confessions / Admissions\| false confessions]] ~~false confessions~~ are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.		Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that [[False Confessions / Admissions\| false confessions]] are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.

	The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals: First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.		The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals: First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.

Ibjadmin at 10:53, 16 February 2011

2011-02-16T10:53:51Z

Ibjadmin at 10:51, 16 February 2011

2011-02-16T10:51:34Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:51, 16 February 2011
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	Traditionally [[Confessions\|confessions]] have been considered the gold standard of [[Evidence\|evidence]] creating an almost irrebuttable proof of the defendant's guilt.This began to change in the 1800's when the U.S. Supreme Court first began to question strong-handed interrogation tactics:		Traditionally [[Confessions\|confessions]] have been considered the gold standard of [[Evidence\|evidence]] creating an almost irrebuttable proof of the defendant's guilt.This began to change in the 1800's when the U.S. Supreme Court first began to question strong-handed interrogation tactics:

	<blockquote>A confession freely and voluntarily made is evidence of the most satisfactory character. But the presumption upon which weight is given; to such evidence -- namely that an innocent man will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made -- either in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise made by, or in the presence of, such person, in reference to such charge.<ref> Hopt. v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887)</ref></blockquote>		<blockquote>A confession freely and voluntarily made is evidence of the most satisfactory character. But the presumption upon which weight is given; to such evidence -- namely that an innocent man will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made -- either in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise made by, or in the presence of, such person, in reference to such charge.<ref> Hopt. v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887)</ref></blockquote>

	It wasn't until 1936 that the Supreme Court determined that involuntary confessions were abhorrent to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendmement of the U.S. Constitution<ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)</ref>. Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that false confessions are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.		It wasn't until 1936 that the Supreme Court determined that involuntary confessions were abhorrent to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendmement of the U.S. Constitution:<ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)</ref>.

	The ~~[[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]]~~ of ~~involuntary evidence~~ is ~~premised on three principals: First~~, ~~exclusion of involuntary confessions tends~~ to ~~deter police misconduct~~. ~~Second~~, ~~a confession should be freely made by a rational person~~. ~~Finally~~, ~~confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable~~.		<blockquote>Coercing the supposed state's criminals into confessions and using such confessions so coerced from them against them in trials has been the curse of all countries. It was the chief inequity, the crowning infamy, of the Star Chamber and the Inquisition, and other similar institutions. The constitution recognized the evils that lay behind these practices, and prohibited them in this country. . . . The duty of maintaining constitutional rights of a person on trial for his life rises above mere rules of procedure, and wherever the court is clearly satisfied that such violations exist, it will refuse to sanction such violations and will apply the corrective.<Ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) quoting Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116, 134 (1926)</ref></blockquote>

	Voluntariness is determined by a factfinder (judge or jury) by examining and taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances.<ref>Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)</ref>.		Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that false confessions are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.

			The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals: First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.

			Voluntariness is determined by a factfinder (judge or jury) by examining and taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances.<ref>Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)</ref>.

	Factors may include objective factors such as:		Factors may include objective factors such as:
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	Similarly, the factfinder must examine the defendant's subjective state of mind to determine whether given all those factors, the confessions was, in fact, involuntary. In doing so, they should consider the defendant's physical and mental characteristics: age, race, education, history and psychological state of mind during the interrogation.		Similarly, the factfinder must examine the defendant's subjective state of mind to determine whether given all those factors, the confessions was, in fact, involuntary. In doing so, they should consider the defendant's physical and mental characteristics: age, race, education, history and psychological state of mind during the interrogation.

	Deception alone is usually not enough to warrant exclusion of a confession as involuntary. In Frazier v. Cupp <ref> Frazier v. Cupp,		Deception alone is usually not enough to warrant exclusion of a confession as involuntary. In Frazier v. Cupp <ref> Frazier v. Cupp,
	394 U.S. 731 (1969)</ref>, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a confession when the police falsely told the defendant that his cousin had confessed to the crime. The court held that deception was just one factor in the voluntariness test and that deception in and of itself was not dispositive.		394 U.S. 731 (1969)</ref>, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a confession when the police falsely told the defendant that his cousin had confessed to the crime. The court held that deception was just one factor in the voluntariness test and that deception in and of itself was not dispositive.

	In certain circumstances, police misconduct may be so egregious that the confession evidence should be excluded without regard for how that conduct the defendant.		In certain circumstances, police misconduct may be so egregious that the confession evidence should be excluded without regard for how that conduct the defendant.
	----		----
	See [[Confessions]], [[McNabb-Mallory Rule]]		See [[Confessions]], [[McNabb-Mallory Rule]]
	==Notes==		==Notes==
	<references/>		<references/>

Ibjadmin at 10:36, 16 February 2011

2011-02-16T10:36:58Z

Ibjadmin at 10:04, 16 February 2011

2011-02-16T10:04:14Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:04, 16 February 2011
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	Traditionally [[Confessions\|confessions]] have been considered the gold standard of [[Evidence\|evidence]] creating an almost irrebuttable proof of the defendant's guilt.This began to change in the 1800's when the U.S. Supreme Court first began to question strong-handed interrogation tactics: “the presumption upon which weight is given to [confessions], namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement.” <ref> Hopt. v. Utah, 120 U.S> 430 (1887)</ref>		Traditionally [[Confessions\|confessions]] have been considered the gold standard of [[Evidence\|evidence]] creating an almost irrebuttable proof of the defendant's guilt.This began to change in the 1800's when the U.S. Supreme Court first began to question strong-handed interrogation tactics: “the presumption upon which weight is given to [confessions], namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement.” <ref> Hopt. v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887)</ref>

	It wasn't until 1936 that the Supreme Court determined that involuntary confessions were abhorrent to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendmement of the U.S. Constitution<ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)</ref>. Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that false confessions are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.		It wasn't until 1936 that the Supreme Court determined that involuntary confessions were abhorrent to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendmement of the U.S. Constitution<ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)</ref>. Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that false confessions are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.

Ibjadmin at 18:18, 15 February 2011

2011-02-15T18:18:17Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:18, 15 February 2011
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	Traditionally [[Confessions\|confessions]] have been considered the gold standard of [[Evidence\|evidence]] creating an almost irrebuttable proof of the defendant's guilt.This began to change in the 1800's when the U.S. Supreme Court first began to question strong-handed interrogation tactics: “the presumption upon which weight is given to [confessions], namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement.” <ref> Hopt. v. Utah, 120 U.S> 430 (1887)</ref>		Traditionally [[Confessions\|confessions]] have been considered the gold standard of [[Evidence\|evidence]] creating an almost irrebuttable proof of the defendant's guilt.This began to change in the 1800's when the U.S. Supreme Court first began to question strong-handed interrogation tactics: “the presumption upon which weight is given to [confessions], namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement.” <ref> Hopt. v. Utah, 120 U.S> 430 (1887)</ref>

	It wasn't until 1936 that the Supreme Court determined that involuntary confessions were abhorrent to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendmement of the U.S. Constitution><ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)</ref>. Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that false confessions are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.		It wasn't until 1936 that the Supreme Court determined that involuntary confessions were abhorrent to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendmement of the U.S. Constitution<ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)</ref>. Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that false confessions are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.

	The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals: First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.		The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals: First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:18, 15 February 2011
Line 1:		Line 1:
	Traditionally [[Confessions\|confessions]] have been considered the gold standard of [[Evidence\|evidence]] creating an almost irrebuttable proof of the defendant's guilt.This began to change in the 1800's when the U.S. Supreme Court first began to question strong-handed interrogation tactics: “the presumption upon which weight is given to [confessions], namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement.” <ref> Hopt. v. Utah, 120 U.S> 430 (1887)</ref>		Traditionally [[Confessions\|confessions]] have been considered the gold standard of [[Evidence\|evidence]] creating an almost irrebuttable proof of the defendant's guilt.This began to change in the 1800's when the U.S. Supreme Court first began to question strong-handed interrogation tactics: “the presumption upon which weight is given to [confessions], namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement.” <ref> Hopt. v. Utah, 120 U.S> 430 (1887)</ref>

	It wasn't until 1936 that the Supreme Court determined that involuntary confessions were abhorrent to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendmement of the U.S. Constitution><ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)</ref>. Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that false confessions are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.		It wasn't until 1936 that the Supreme Court determined that involuntary confessions were abhorrent to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendmement of the U.S. Constitution<ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)</ref>. Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that false confessions are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.

	The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals: First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.		The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals: First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:53, 16 February 2011
Line 1:		Line 1:
	Traditionally [[Confessions\|confessions]] have been considered the gold standard of [[Evidence\|evidence]] creating an almost irrebuttable proof of the defendant's guilt.This began to change in the 1800's when the U.S. Supreme Court first began to question strong-handed interrogation tactics:		Traditionally [[Confessions\|confessions]] have been considered the gold standard of [[Evidence\|evidence]] creating an almost irrebuttable proof of the defendant's guilt.This began to change in the 1800's when the U.S. Supreme Court first began to question strong-handed interrogation tactics:

	<blockquote>A confession freely and voluntarily made is evidence of the most satisfactory character. But the presumption upon which weight is given; to such evidence -- namely that an innocent man will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made -- either in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise made by, or in the presence of, such person, in reference to such charge.<ref> Hopt. v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887)</ref></blockquote>		<blockquote>A confession freely and voluntarily made is evidence of the most satisfactory character. But the presumption upon which weight is given; to such evidence -- namely that an innocent man will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made -- either in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise made by, or in the presence of, such person, in reference to such charge.<ref> Hopt. v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887)</ref></blockquote>

	It wasn't until 1936 that the Supreme Court determined that involuntary confessions were abhorrent to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendmement of the U.S. Constitution:<ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)</ref>.		It wasn't until 1936 that the Supreme Court determined that involuntary confessions were abhorrent to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendmement of the U.S. Constitution:<ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)</ref>.

	<blockquote>Coercing the supposed state's criminals into confessions and using such confessions so coerced from them against them in trials has been the curse of all countries. It was the chief inequity, the crowning infamy, of the Star Chamber and the Inquisition, and other similar institutions. The constitution recognized the evils that lay behind these practices, and prohibited them in this country. . . . The duty of maintaining constitutional rights of a person on trial for his life rises above mere rules of procedure, and wherever the court is clearly satisfied that such violations exist, it will refuse to sanction such violations and will apply the corrective.<Ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) quoting Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116, 134 (1926)</ref></blockquote>		<blockquote>Coercing the supposed state's criminals into confessions and using such confessions so coerced from them against them in trials has been the curse of all countries. It was the chief inequity, the crowning infamy, of the Star Chamber and the Inquisition, and other similar institutions. The constitution recognized the evils that lay behind these practices, and prohibited them in this country. . . . The duty of maintaining constitutional rights of a person on trial for his life rises above mere rules of procedure, and wherever the court is clearly satisfied that such violations exist, it will refuse to sanction such violations and will apply the corrective.<Ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) quoting Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116, 134 (1926)</ref></blockquote>

	Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that false confessions are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.		Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that [[False Confessions / Admissions\| false confessions]] false confessions are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.

	The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals: First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.		The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals: First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.

	Voluntariness is determined by a factfinder (judge or jury) by examining and taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances.<ref>Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)</ref>.		Voluntariness is determined by a factfinder (judge or jury) by examining and taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances.<ref>Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)</ref>.

	Factors may include objective factors such as:		Factors may include objective factors such as:
Line 22:		Line 22:
	Similarly, the factfinder must examine the defendant's subjective state of mind to determine whether given all those factors, the confessions was, in fact, involuntary. In doing so, they should consider the defendant's physical and mental characteristics: age, race, education, history and psychological state of mind during the interrogation.		Similarly, the factfinder must examine the defendant's subjective state of mind to determine whether given all those factors, the confessions was, in fact, involuntary. In doing so, they should consider the defendant's physical and mental characteristics: age, race, education, history and psychological state of mind during the interrogation.

	Deception alone is usually not enough to warrant exclusion of a confession as involuntary. In Frazier v. Cupp <ref> Frazier v. Cupp,		Deception alone is usually not enough to warrant exclusion of a confession as involuntary. In Frazier v. Cupp <ref> Frazier v. Cupp,
	394 U.S. 731 (1969)</ref>, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a confession when the police falsely told the defendant that his cousin had confessed to the crime. The court held that deception was just one factor in the voluntariness test and that deception in and of itself was not dispositive.		394 U.S. 731 (1969)</ref>, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a confession when the police falsely told the defendant that his cousin had confessed to the crime. The court held that deception was just one factor in the voluntariness test and that deception in and of itself was not dispositive.

	In certain circumstances, police misconduct may be so egregious that the confession evidence should be excluded without regard for how that conduct the defendant.		In certain circumstances, police misconduct may be so egregious that the confession evidence should be excluded without regard for how that conduct the defendant.
	----		----
	See [[Confessions]], [[McNabb-Mallory Rule]]		See [[Confessions]], [[McNabb-Mallory Rule]]
	==Notes==		==Notes==
	<references/>		<references/>

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:36, 16 February 2011
Line 1:		Line 1:
	Traditionally [[Confessions\|confessions]] have been considered the gold standard of [[Evidence\|evidence]] creating an almost irrebuttable proof of the defendant's guilt.This began to change in the 1800's when the U.S. Supreme Court first began to question strong-handed interrogation tactics: ~~“the~~ presumption upon which weight is given to ~~[confessions],~~ namely, that ~~one who is~~ innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement.” <ref> Hopt. v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887)</ref>		Traditionally [[Confessions\|confessions]] have been considered the gold standard of [[Evidence\|evidence]] creating an almost irrebuttable proof of the defendant's guilt.This began to change in the 1800's when the U.S. Supreme Court first began to question strong-handed interrogation tactics:

			<blockquote>A confession freely and voluntarily made is evidence of the most satisfactory character. But the presumption upon which weight is given; to such evidence -- namely that an innocent man will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made -- either in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise made by, or in the presence of, such person, in reference to such charge.<ref> Hopt. v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887)</ref></blockquote>

	It wasn't until 1936 that the Supreme Court determined that involuntary confessions were abhorrent to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendmement of the U.S. Constitution<ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)</ref>. Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that false confessions are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.		It wasn't until 1936 that the Supreme Court determined that involuntary confessions were abhorrent to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendmement of the U.S. Constitution<ref>Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)</ref>. Confessions which are involuntary may be [[Exclusionary Rule\|excluded]] from evidence unless the defendant [[Opening the Door to Excluded Evidence\|opens the door]] to the admission of the confession. Recent studies have demonstrated that false confessions are a real and ever present threat to fair adjudication of criminal cases.

	The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals: First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.		The [[Exclusionary Rule\|exclusion]] of involuntary evidence is premised on three principals: First, exclusion of involuntary confessions tends to deter police misconduct. Second, a confession should be freely made by a rational person. Finally, confessions obtained with duress are inherently unreliable.

	Voluntariness is determined by a factfinder (judge or jury) by examining and taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances.<ref>Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)</ref>.		Voluntariness is determined by a factfinder (judge or jury) by examining and taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances.<ref>Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)</ref>.

	Factors may include objective factors such as:		Factors may include objective factors such as:
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	Similarly, the factfinder must examine the defendant's subjective state of mind to determine whether given all those factors, the confessions was, in fact, involuntary. In doing so, they should consider the defendant's physical and mental characteristics: age, race, education, history and psychological state of mind during the interrogation.		Similarly, the factfinder must examine the defendant's subjective state of mind to determine whether given all those factors, the confessions was, in fact, involuntary. In doing so, they should consider the defendant's physical and mental characteristics: age, race, education, history and psychological state of mind during the interrogation.

	Deception alone is usually not enough to warrant exclusion of a confession as involuntary. In Frazier v. Cupp <ref> Frazier v. Cupp,		Deception alone is usually not enough to warrant exclusion of a confession as involuntary. In Frazier v. Cupp <ref> Frazier v. Cupp,
	394 U.S. 731 (1969)</ref>, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a confession when the police falsely told the defendant that his cousin had confessed to the crime. The court held that deception was just one factor in the voluntariness test and that deception in and of itself was not dispositive.		394 U.S. 731 (1969)</ref>, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a confession when the police falsely told the defendant that his cousin had confessed to the crime. The court held that deception was just one factor in the voluntariness test and that deception in and of itself was not dispositive.

	In certain circumstances, police misconduct may be so egregious that the confession evidence should be excluded without regard for how that conduct the defendant.		In certain circumstances, police misconduct may be so egregious that the confession evidence should be excluded without regard for how that conduct the defendant.
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	See [[Confessions]], [[McNabb-Mallory Rule]]		See [[Confessions]], [[McNabb-Mallory Rule]]
	==Notes==		==Notes==
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