Void for Vagueness

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A defendant in the Unite States may be able to challenge a statute on grounds that it violates the fundamental due process clause of the 5th and 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution because it is overly vague. The void for vagueness doctrine has its roots in the notion that everyone should have fair notice of what constitutes a crime.

The doctrine was explained in Jordan v. De George:

The essential purpose of the "void for vagueness" doctrine is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, decided April 23, 1951; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103-104 (1945). This Court has repeatedly stated that criminal statutes which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal before it is done are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).[1]

The test for whether a given statue is vague is objective in nature and asks whether the provision "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." [2]

The rationale behind the void for vagueness doctrine rests on four interrelated principles:

First, statutes which are vague invest too much power in the prosecution, resulting in arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. [3]

  1. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951)
  2. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617
  3. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242